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SUMMARY:
... The fair use doctrine of copyright law permits use of a copyrighted work
without permission of the copyright holder. ... This will be termed the
"balancing approach" to fair use. ... Fair use may thus be necessary to prevent
the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from undue control over
the noncopyrightable aspects of her work. ... Defendant, who objected to the
content of the exhibit, published a pamphlet that reproduced parts of the
supposedly objectionable works. ... Harper & Row is entirely consistent with a
balancing approach to fair use. ... Rather, fair use was appropriately applied
to prevent the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from becoming
an instrument for controlling the flow of ideas. ... The balancing approach
(seeing fair use as balancing incentives) goes on to consider whether denying
fair use would effectively grant the copyright holder a measure of control over
noncopyrightable aspects of the work, such as ideas, functional aspects, or
markets other than those to sell or license the work. ... The balancing approach
to fair use would suggest a more tempered approach. ... A balancing approach to
fair use, however, might reach a different result. ...
TEXT:
[*61]
The fair use doctrine of copyright law permits use of a copyrighted work without
permission of the copyright holder. 1 Fair use authorizes one to tape a
television program for later viewing, 2 to write a parody of a copyrighted song,
3 or to photocopy a law review article for research. It does not permit a
magazine to publish key passages from a forthcoming autobiography of President
Ford, 4 or permit a television station to copy and televise a news service's
videotape of an assault, 5 or permit a corporation systematically to make copies
of academic articles in lieu [*62] of subscribing to the journals. 6 As
digital technologies expand the possibilities for creative works, the breadth of
the fair use doctrine will affect the control given copyright holders. Although
attempts have been made, the fair use doctrine has not been reduced to a single
form susceptible of straightforward application. 7 Authorities regularly call
fair use so malleable as to be indeterminate. 8 For example, the application of
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fair use to photocopying is unsettled despite decades of litigation. 9 Fair use
cases seem to produce a disproportionate share of reversals and divided courts.
10 Accordingly, the demand is great among courts and commentators for a clear
approach to fair use. 11
In recent years, increasing support has coalesced for a view that promises to
reduce fair use to a simple, elegant conceptual framework, which will be termed
the "transaction cost approach." 12 Under that [*63] view, fair use should
only apply to overcome certain narrowly defined cases of market failure settings where transaction costs impede voluntary licensing agreements. 13 That
approach would narrow the application of fair use - and further narrow it with
increasing use of networked communications, on the grounds that transaction
costs shrink as the links between parties increase in number and speed. 14 That
narrower view of fair use is reflected in judicial decisions, 15 academic
commentary 16 and proposed amendments to adapt the copyright statute [*64] to
the world of networked digital communication. 17 Even commentators less
sympathetic to expanded copyright have noted an apparent narrowing of fair use.
18
The transaction cost view of fair use, as Part I explains, takes the "tragedy of
the commons," a celebrated insight about real property, and seeks to apply to it
to intellectual property. 19 Where property is held in common, with unlimited
access to all, individuals may use it wastefully, because they do not bear the
costs. 20 In addition, because access is free, no market mechanisms form to
channel resources toward the highest valued use. The transaction cost approach
takes a similar view of the intellectual property created by copyright. In this
view, permitting fair use of a copyrighted work is, to the extent of that use,
tantamount to holding the work in common, leading to inefficient overuse of the
resource and blocking pricing signals. Accordingly, fair use should be limited
to situations where transaction costs impede licensing transactions. In one
elegant conceptualization, fair use serves simply as "a compulsory license
provision with a royalty of zero," 21 applicable in situations where the
copyright holder would not have received a royalty anyway because of transaction
costs. Such situations, in the view of many, will become fewer and fewer as
technology lowers transaction costs by facilitating the dissemination and
licensing of copyrighted works. In a world where copies can be distributed
world-wide and software can be used to form licensing contracts (such as [*65]
clicking on an icon to accept terms), the need to apply fair use will shrink. 22
Accordingly, fair use would gradually give way to licensed uses. 23 Such
reliance on market-oriented economic theory has been termed a "neoclassical"
view 24 or a "property rights" approach to copyright. 25 Because it holds that
extending copyright protection as far as markets can reach will ultimately
benefit all, it has been called the view of "copyright optimists." 26
Considering this Article will be primarily interested on its effect on public
domain, the term "privatization" will be utilized.
This Article argues against a narrowing of the fair use doctrine. Part II
discusses how differences between real property and intellectual property
undercut the application of the tragedy of the commons to the fair use setting.
While real property is a limited resource, intellectual property is not. The
same parcel of land may not support an unlimited number of grazing sheep. But
making one more copy of a book does not destroy other copies (although it may
reduce their market value). 27 The ideas in the book, indeed, may gain value
from use, refinement, and propagation. Thus, the same public good 28 nature of
works of authorship that justifies intellectual property also differentiates it
from real property. Moreover, the boundaries in copyright are far more uncertain
than those around a parcel of land. Copyright demarcates protected [*66]
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subject matter with elusive distinctions - originality, abstraction, and
functionality.
Part II further addresses the theoretical underpinning of the transaction cost
approach, the idea that copyright should be maximally privatized. 29 Under that
view, concentrating control in the hands of the author by constricting fair use
would most efficiently exploit the resource. But this view overlooks factors
that can prevent copyright holders from permitting many uses. First, transaction
costs are not the only obstacle to licensing valuable uses. Issues of status, 30
risk aversion, and other obstacles to negotiations could obstruct licensing of
many productive uses. 31 Second, increases in electronic commerce and
communications will lower some types of transaction costs, but many components
are likely to remain unaffected. Accordingly, the Internet will not yield the
frictionless marketplace postulated by the transaction cost view. Reducing the
scope of fair use could create deadweight loss to productive uses. 32
[*67] Part III discusses an alternative, the balancing view of fair use, which
relies on a different view of the property created by copyright. 33 The
transaction cost view conceptualizes intellectual property as a single resource
that can be split up in pieces and identified with the copies of the work. But
the rights under copyright are not coextensive with the physical copies. Others
remain free to copy the ideas expressed in a copyrighted work, 34 the functional
aspects of the work, and the facts from the work. 35 Fair use has served as a
device to ensure that the copyright owner's control over the expressive aspects
of her work do not extend to the noncopyrightable aspects.
Part IV compares the transaction cost view and the balancing view of fair use in
the context of a number of live issues: whether a temporary copy in a computer's
memory infringes copyright, how much legal protection should be afforded copy
protection technology, how broad the exclusive right to make derivative works
should be, whether one could archive the World Wide Web, and the application of
fair use to photocopying and other means of reducing the costs of disseminating
copies. This Article will conclude that, although the transaction cost approach
might simplify fair use analysis, it would do so by undercutting certain core
limitations on copyright. Rather than shrinking away in the digital age, fair
use should continue to be a means to implement the balances struck by copyright
law.
[*68]
I. The Transaction Cost Approach to Fair Use
As the following parts will discuss, the scope of fair use depends on the
relationship between fair use and the other limitations on copyright. The
transaction cost approach views fair use as an autonomous doctrine, which
functions only to rectify certain market failures. This Article will argue that
fair use plays a more integral role in copyright law, giving effect to the other
limitations. As a prelude to that discussion, this Part sketches the doctrinal
place of fair use in copyright law and describes the transaction cost approach
to the doctrine's proper scope. A number of works describe the historical
development of fair use in case law and legislation. 36 Accordingly, this Part
focuses on the place of fair use among the various limitations on the subject
matter and exclusive rights of a copyright.
A. Fair Use and the Other Limitations on Copyright
The privatization approach would make fair use independent of the other
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limitations on copyright, by making transaction costs the primary focus of fair
use analysis. Because this Article will argue that fair use is more closely
related to the other limitations, this section first outlines the overall
structure of copyright law. The author of an original work of authorship
receives the copyright in the work. 37 Copyright's broad scope extends to the
entire range of creative works: letters, 38 history books, 39 paintings, 40
songs, 41 video games, 42 movies, 43 and computer programs. 44 The copyright
holder has a number of exclusive [*69] rights. 45 Only the holder of the
copyright may make copies of the work, make derivative works, distribute copies
of the work to the public, [*70] or publicly display the work or perform the
work in public. 46 Thus, if an author has written a play, then others may
infringe the copyright by making copies of the play, making a movie derivative
of the play, distributing copies of the play, performing the play in public, or
displaying the text to the public. But the control over the work granted by
copyright is far from total. The prerogatives granted are limited to the
exclusive rights listed in the statute. Others may make use of the copyrighted
work in ways that do not fall within the exclusive rights. One does not need
permission to read a copyrighted book or write about a copyrighted painting.
A number of subject matter limitations also cut into the scope of the copyright.
A copy of a play contains copyrighted expression subject to the author's
exclusive rights, but the copy also embodies much that is not subject to
protection. First, copyright protects only original expressive elements. 47
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held there was no infringement
where the maker of a telephone directory copied another directory's factual
listings of names and numbers because an author does not create facts. 48 The
originality requirement also limits the protection given fictional works, which
necessarily use elements that are not the author's original expressions. 49 To
the extent a work incorporates nonoriginal elements such as commonplace plot
devices, others are free to copy such elements without the permission of the
copyright holder. 50
Another profound limitation is the rule that copyright does not restrict the use
of ideas. 51 The author's copyright protects only expression; others are free to
copy or apply the author's ideas. 52 A pair of opinions by Judge Learned Hand
best illustrate the rather elusive distinction. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corporation, 53 Judge Hand held there was no infringement where the second
author copied such elements as a quarrel between Jewish and Irish fathers,
marriage of their children, reconciliation, and some stock characters. By
contrast, in Sheldon v. [*71] Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 54 the
copying was more specific. The second author took more than the plot of the
play, in which a young woman poisoned an overly ardent lover but won acquittal
after some friendly perjury, the author took the specific events and details of
various scenes such as the use of a gaucho song as an aphrodisiac, conveniently
mislaid poison, and a thwarted attempt to make a telephone call for aid.
The distinction between copyrightable expression and noncopy-rightable ideas
carries over to the line of cases under Baker v. Selden, now codified in the
copyright statute. 55 These cases hold that the functional aspects of a work are
unprotected by copyright, but its aesthetic, expressive aspects are protected.
The lower level of protection afforded works with functional aspects has become
especially important as copyright law has been extended to computer software. It
is established that one cannot simply copy every byte of a copyrighted program
and sell copies, but how much protection copyright affords beyond that is
unsettled. 56
The originality requirement and the nonprotection of ideas are limits on each of
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the copyright holder's exclusive rights. The Copyright Act further provides
specific limits applicable to only some of the exclusive rights. The copyright
owner's exclusive rights to distribute and display the work are subject to the
first sale doctrine, which provides that the [*72] owner of a lawfully made
copy may display or dispose of that particular copy. 57 Thus, the owner of a
painting may display the painting or sell it. The public display and performance
rights are subject to a number of specific exceptions. Although the author of a
song generally has the exclusive right to perform it in public (whether live or
through a recording), the statute authorizes performances in face-to-face
nonprofit teaching, in religious services, during charitable events, or by
playing a modestly sized radio in a business. 58 Some limitations are geared to
specific types of copyrightable works. The copyright in an architectural work is
not infringed by taking a picture of a building visible to the public. 59 The
copyright in a computer program is not infringed if the owner of a copy of the
program makes a copy in order to use the program or to have a back-up copy. 60
The fair use doctrine is a general limitation on all the copyright holder's
exclusive rights. Without the author's permission, someone may make copies (or
make derivative works, or perform the work, or display or distribute copies) if
the activity qualifies as fair use. 61 Rather than attempt to define fair use,
the copyright statute lists particular uses likely to qualify as fair use:
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 62
Whether a use falls into one of the favored categories, however, does not
determine whether it is a fair use. A use outside the categories may qualify as
fair use, and a use within a favored category may fail to qualify. The statute
further requires a court to consider four factors drawn from a nineteenth
century opinion by Justice Story: 63
[*73]
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 64
The provision does not provide particularly clear guidance in deciding whether a
particular use qualifies. A court must first decide whether the use falls into
one of several broad and vague categories. The court is then to apply four
factors, but not told how to weigh any of the factors against each other.
Accordingly, fair use is considered difficult and unpredictable. 65
The greatest uncertainty of fair use is where it
of copyright law. The next section discusses how
copyright would make fair use independent of the
by making transaction costs the primary focus of

fits in the overall framework
the privatization approach to
other limitations on copyright
fair use analysis.

B. The Transaction Cost Approach to Fair Use
Although this Article will argue that the transaction cost approach results in
an unsatisfactory and narrow view of fair use, the approach does have some merit
in that it reduces a tangled doctrine to a clear conceptual framework. Under the
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transaction cost approach, the primary question would be whether defendant's use
could have occurred by obtaining a license from the copyright holder. If
defendant could have sought permission from the copyright holder, then fair use
would be unlikely to apply. If transaction costs or other narrowly defined
market failures would have prevented a voluntary transaction, then fair use
would be more likely to apply.
The transaction cost approach rests on the paradigmatic justification for
private property, the "tragedy of the commons," which demonstrates how dividing
resources into privately owned parcels can lead to greater [*74] social
welfare than holding the resources in common. One might think that public
ownership of property with unrestricted access to all would permit the greatest
social benefits. But where property is held in common, meaning everyone may use
it freely, there are great incentives for inefficient behavior. 66 Individuals
are likely to consume resources without taking into consideration the costs.
Classic examples are littering, over-grazing, and pollution. Where property is
privately held, an individual both receives the benefits and bears the costs of
a particular use, so the individual has an incentive to use the property as
efficiently as possible. If another individual can get greater benefit from that
particular piece of property, then the second individual may purchase it. Thus,
privatization of property has two primary functions. First it internalizes costs
and benefits, increasing the chances that resources will be used efficiently. 67
Second, it permits markets to form, permitting resources to flow, through
voluntary transactions, to the highest-valued use. 68 The transaction cost view
of fair use takes a similar view of the intellectual property created by
copyright. Under that approach, copyright privatizes intellectual property by
according the copyright holder the bundle of exclusive rights. Concentrating the
rights in one place gives the copyright holder an incentive to exploit them in
an effective manner. If someone else can make more valuable use of any or all of
the rights, then the other may pay for an assignment of the copyright or a
license of some of the rights. Indeed, permitting others to use the work without
the copyright holder's permission would interfere with the formation of market
mechanisms. 69
Fair use, under that view, is a narrow exception to the "privatization" of
intellectual property. 70 Fair use would apply only where transaction costs
interfere with the centralized control through licensing with the copyright
holder. Such applications of fair use have been put into two categories. 71 In
the first, no agreement is reached because the transac [*75] tion costs to
arrange the license would exceed the potential benefit. For example, a daily
newspaper seeks to print two paragraphs from a textbook in a book review. 72 The
costs of arranging to get permission from the textbook author (delay,
communication, and negotiation) would likely exceed the benefit of the use,
meaning that if permission were necessary the newspaper might likely forego the
use. The second category of uses that might be obstructed by transaction costs
occur when the user does not capture the entire benefit of the use, and thus
might not be able to pay for a license. 73 Some uses of a copyright work, such
as teaching, criticism, or research, benefit not just the immediate users but
society generally. But a teacher, a critic, or a researcher may not be able to
get the rest of society to pay for the diffuse benefits flowing from their use
of the work; the transaction costs of dealing with all members of society and
figuring out how much each benefitted would be prohibitive. A license might be
available, but the fee might be prohibitive because it could not be recovered
from the ultimate beneficiaries. In both categories, allowing the use under fair
use would not harm the copyright holder, because by hypothesis a licensing
transaction was not feasible. Conversely, the transaction cost approach would
deny fair use even to valuable uses if they could have been licensed. In many
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such cases, voluntary licensing would result in both the realization of the
social value and compensation to the author. 74 As one influential law review
article framed it, fair use would apply only where three conditions are met:
"(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is
socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial
injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner." 75
So viewed, fair use is analogous to various real property doctrines that have
also been justified by the existence of transaction costs. 76 The owner of real
property normally has the right to exclude others from her property. Others who
enter must have her permission, or commit trespass. In a situation of necessity,
however, such a voluntary transaction may be impossible. Accordingly, the
doctrine of necessity [*76] permits entry without the permission of the
landowner. 77 Fair use, under the transaction cost approach, is considered to
play a role similar to necessity: it applies where transaction costs block a
beneficial, voluntary license. By the same token, fair use, under such a view,
would be as strictly limited as the privileges to use others' real property. If
the doctrine of necessity were too widely applied, then people could use the
property of others without seeking permission. Such externalities would lead to
the same inefficiencies as the tragedy of the commons. Likewise, if fair use is
applied where permission could have been sought, then intellectual property
would be used inefficiently.
The transaction cost approach diverges dramatically from the traditional
approach to copyright law, which has generally seen copyright law as setting a
balance between the incentives given to authors and the costs of access to the
public. 78 The greater protection copyright law gives copyright holders, the
greater the cost of access to those works for consumers and other authors who
use copyrighted works. 79 Thus, analysis of copyright law frequently speaks of
striking a balance, whether it be between authors and the public, or between
authors and subsequent authors. Along the same lines, analyses of the fair use
doctrine have often spoken of the need to balance competing interests. 80 The
transaction cost approach would generally eschew such balancing analysis,
leaving choices about resource allocation to be answered by market mechanisms. A
defendant would not be able to argue for fair use by showing that the benefits
from her use outweighed the detriment to the copyright holder. Rather, under the
transaction cost approach, if such a surplus existed, then presumably the
defendant would be able to pay for a license. Only if the transaction costs were
greater than the potential surplus might fair use be applicable - and even then,
only if it did not harm the plaintiff. 81
[*77] The transaction cost approach thus seeks to shift the balancing from the
province of the courts to that of the market. Rather than having judges decide
whether the benefits of a use outweigh the decreased incentives to authors,
allocation would be left to market mechanisms. Under this view, someone who
believes they have a valuable use for a creative work would presumptively back
up their belief with a willingness to pay (or ability to persuade the copyright
holder to permit the use without requiring a fee). Accordingly, fair use would
be applied as sparingly as possible, because permitting people to use
copyrighted works without a license interferes with the ability of market
mechanisms to allocate resources through pricing information. From the copyright
holder's point of view, how much others are willing to pay for particular uses
provides the information necessary to decide how best to make use of the
creative work.
Such a view also represents a shift from the traditional view of the role of
copyright law. The conventional view is that copyright served as an necessary
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incentive for authors to produce creative works; 82 the transaction cost
approach extends the role of copyright law to providing a baseline for the
efficient exploitation of works that have already been produced. Such a view has
implications for copyright beyond fair use. A brief discussion of copyright
duration will serve to contrast the privatization and balancing approaches.
Proposed legislation before Congress would extend the duration of a copyright by
some twenty years. 83 Under the present statute, an individual author's
copyright lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years, and the copyright
in a work-for-hire lasts seventy-five years from the year of publication. 84
Pending legislation would extend those terms to life-plus-seventy and
ninety-five years respectively. 85 Such extensions would apply to [*78]
copyrights presently existing, as well as future copyrights. 86 Under the
incentive-to-produce approach, applying the extension to existing copyrights
would be unnecessary; no additional incentive is necessary where the works have
already been produced. 87 Moreover, the lengthened term for future copyrights
also has little justification from the incentive point of view. Whether an
author's copyright will outlive her by fifty or seventy years will have little
effect on her decision on whether to write a book or create a painting. If one
accepts the privatization rationale, however, such legislation would seem more
justified. Extending the term of copyright leaves it in private hands longer
before it falls into the public domain, meaning that the copyright holder
retains an incentive to find the most productive use of the copyright. Under
such a view longer copyright terms would provide incentives for investment in
new uses and for allocation of works to the highest-valued use.
The transaction cost approach to fair use would similarly support increasing the
scope of copyright protection. One way to effectively increase the scope of the
copyright holder's exclusive rights is to narrow the limitation provided by fair
use. An increase in copyright duration would require legislative action. The
narrowing of fair use, however, has been begun by more restrictive judicial
opinions among the lower courts, underpinned by academic commentary. 88 Two
Supreme Court opinions, Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated v. Nation
Enterprises 89 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Incorporated, 90 can be
interpreted to support the transaction cost approach, 91 although this Article
will argue in Part III for a broader reading of the opinions. 92 Harper & Row
held fair use inapplicable where the defendant magazine, the Nation, had printed
several hundred words of former President Gerald Ford's autobiography without
permission shortly before it was to be [*79] published. The Court observed in
a footnote that some economists have written that fair use should apply only
where the market will not function. 93 The Court also quoted a noted study of
fair use that concluded the core issue was, "would the reasonable copyright
owner have consented to the use?" 94 One can interpret that as supporting the
proposition that fair use should apply only where a reasonable copyright holder
would have permitted the use, had transaction costs not interfered.
The support Campbell lends to the transaction cost approach is more indirect.
Campbell held that 2 Live Crew's parody version of "Oh, Pretty Woman" could be a
fair use of the original version of the song. Such a result is consistent with
the transaction cost interpretation of the parody cases. Making a parody of a
copyrighted song constitutes making a derivative work, which would normally be
within the prerogatives of the copyright holder. But, just as transaction costs
can block a licensing agreement, so could the fact that the parody makes fun of
the original song. 95 An author is unlikely to license another song that
parodies their work, and is also unlikely to write a parody of their own work.
96 Permitting the parody under fair use permits a use without costing the author
any revenue (because the author would not have granted a license), the same
reasons that justify applying fair use in settings of prohibitive transaction
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costs generally. Although permitting the parody does undercut the owner's
ability to control productive uses, it does so only in an area where the owner
is unlikely to exploit the work. So Campbell's result can be seen as agreeing
with the transaction cost approach. But the next section raises the objection
that the author's reluctance to permit a parody seems inapt to cases, like
Campbell, where the copyright was no longer held by the original author. More
generally, this Article will argue the transaction cost [*80] approach
underestimates both the complexities of the boundaries of copyright and the
obstacles to obtaining permission to use copyrighted works.
II. A Critique of the Transaction Cost Approach
The transaction cost approach to fair use relies on a view of copyright that
creates easily traded parcels of intellectual property. 97 In order to see that
such property is used by the highest valued use, the parcels are allocated to
the copyright holder, who can sell any or all to the highest bidder. By analogy
to real property, thorough privatization of intellectual property is a necessary
condition to permitting market mechanisms to a form that will facilitate the
most efficient exploitation of intellectual property. 98 This Part first argues
that the analogy to real property is undermined by the nature of the boundaries
of copyright, which are far more difficult to determine that those of physical
property. It may be easy to identify copies of a copyrighted work, but a copy is
not coextensive with the property right. The Part next argues that the
transaction cost approach overestimates the fluidity of markets for intellectual
property. Although some transaction costs may be reduced in an era of networked
communications, others will increase. Moreover, other obstacles to transactions
exist beyond the basic costs of arranging licenses. 99
A. Boundaries
The rationale for privatizing property relies on readily identifiable borders.
100 The boundaries of physical property are generally rather straightforward to
determine. 101 The boundaries of real property are [*81] readily described by
metes and bounds or other methods. The boundaries of a piece of physical
personal property are readily apparent. The owner of a car can tell where the
car ends and the pavement begins. Conversion and nuisance, the core torts
involving property rights, are both notoriously difficult to define. 102 But the
material that is the subject of the property right is itself usually easy to
identify. Boundary drawing problems are the exceptional cases, such as in
concepts of commingling or accessions, where personal property has been mixed
together. 103
The transaction approach to fair use assumes that property boundaries in
copyright are readily identifiable, but this assumption misses the distinction
between the physical copies of a work and the property rights afforded by
copyright. For example, the notion that the Internet will drastically reduce
transaction costs rests on the assumption that a copy of a copyrighted work,
encoded with information on contacting (or just paying) the copyright holder
will readily identify the copyrighted property to be licensed. But a copy of a
copyrighted work is not like a parcel of property. Rather, every copy
unavoidably contains both copyrightable elements and noncopyrightable elements
that are not the copyright holder's to sell. 104 Rather than the readily
ascertainable boundaries of physical property, the intellectual property
afforded by copyright is demarcated by the notoriously indeterminate boundaries
of the originality requirement and the idea/expression distinction. The
nonoriginal elements in the copy and any ideas (or functional elements, or
facts, or methods of operation, and so on) are not part of the copyright

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991181

holder's interest. One can hardly discern those by examining the copy in
isolation. 105 Where commingling and accessions are relatively uncommon problems
in dealing with physical property, [*82] analogous problems inhere with every
copyrighted work, because each work combines original expression with
nonprotected elements. The boundaries are abstract and vague. With respect to
originality, the boundary may be so uncertain as to be impossible to draw. 106
Every creative work necessarily incorporates nonoriginal elements. 107 The line
between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas is likewise elusive.
In the leading case on the distinction between ideas and expression, Judge
Learned Hand stated that it was necessarily an ad hoc determination: "Nobody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." 108
It is no easier to determine which aspects of a work are noncopyrightable
functional aspects. Courts have faced difficult decisions in drawing that line,
holding that an artistically appealing belt-buckle is copyrightable, 109 but
that a model of a human torso used to model clothes was not. 110 A light stand
with fanciful dancing figures serves a function but has sufficiently separate
aesthetic aspects to be copyrightable, 111 but a light fixture with an abstract
shape was held to be functional and thus noncopyrightable. 112 Courts have
similar problems with computer programs. 113 The recent cases, culminating in
the Supreme Court's indeterminate four to four split in Lotus v. [*83]
Borland, have given little definitive guidance. 114 Courts readily agree that
the functional aspects of a computer program are not protected, but have been
unable to formulate any clear guide for separating the functional aspects from
the expressive aspects. 115 The leading case on point, Computer Associates, 116
formulated a test that simply restates the abstractions analysis. 117 Indeed,
some commentators have argued that software's inherently functional aspect makes
it sufficiently different from other creative works to require a new form of
intellectual property protection. 118 The fact that copies of works necessarily
contain both copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements leads to another a
problem that Part III will suggest is addressed by fair use. 119 The copyright
[*84] holder's control over copies of the work may lead to control over
noncopyrighted aspects of the work, especially with respect to digital works
that are generally disseminated as undifferentiated copies.
The uncertainties of boundaries in copyright counsel against expanding the
exclusive rights by narrowing fair use. The privatization rationale is sharply
undercut if property boundaries are unclear. Privatizing property is a means to
provide the owner an incentive to find the most efficient use of the property.
To the extent that the owner is unsure where the boundaries lie, or unaware of
how broadly the boundaries have been extended, the incentive to exploit that
intellectual property is undercut. 120 At the same time, to the extent others
are unsure whether certain uses are protected by copyright or whether they fall
in the public domain, potential users are discouraged by the chance that their
activity may be infringement. Expanding copyright would likely exacerbate
boundary drawing problems. To the extent that the exclusive rights of copyright
holders are expanded at the expense of the public domain, uncertainties about
the borderline cases will also increase.
B. Transaction Costs
The other premise of the transaction cost approach is that voluntary
transactions will lead to more efficient exploitation of creative works than
permitting fair use. 121 Markets, whether for copies of works or for licensing
uses and derivative works, indeed play the primary role in disseminating
creative works, both with respect to the copyrighted aspects "belonging" to the
author and to the noncopyrighted elements unavoidably carried along. But the
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transaction cost approach, which would rely almost exclusively on voluntary
transactions as long as transaction costs were no obstacle, greatly
underestimates the obstacles to voluntary transactions in some settings. First,
even world-wide networked communications will not diminish many aspects of
transaction costs. More important, other impediments remain, such as risk
aversion, status considerations, and information costs. 122
[*85] The transaction cost approach suggests that increased use of digital
technologies will dramatically lower transaction costs, which would justify a
narrowing of fair use. 123 In the near future, many or most copyrighted works
could be in digital form for dissemination over communications networks, or
networks of networks such as the Internet. 124 Copyright holders could readily
post the terms on which works could be licensed, including various prices for
different uses and conditions on use. 125 Thus, a potential user would often
need to do little more than click a mouse to license a use. In such a world, the
argument runs, transaction costs will be so low as to drastically reduce or even
eliminate fair use and other exceptions to the copyright holder's exclusive
rights. 126 But that argument views transaction costs narrowly, from the view of
the copyright holder. It contemplates that the copyright holder will set a
schedule of charges and offer it to potential users. A user who did not fall
into one of the listed categories, or had a potential use that the copyright
holder had not contemplated, would still have to attempt to contact the
copyright holder and negotiate an individualized license. 127 In a world where
copyright holders increasingly rely on mechanical licensing, such individualized
requests may indeed be less likely to receive full consideration. A related
problem is that expanding the prerogatives of the copyright holder permits the
holder to appropriate all the surplus value from new uses of the work, even
where part of such value arises from the independent contribution of others.
[*86] One initially appealing argument for stringent limits on fair use,
particularly on the Internet, is that it would support publication of material
for small, specialized audiences. 128 Considering there might only be a few
people world wide that are interested in an esoteric subject, if fair use
allowed even a few people free access to the work, it would greatly reduce the
necessary incentive to produce the work. Thus, the argument runs, restriction of
fair use will permit much greater diversity of expression. But the argument goes
too far. Restricting all fair use in order to protect a few esoteric markets is
unnecessary. The effect on the market for the copyrighted work is a key factor
in fair use analysis, but one can distinguish between different markets. A small
use that threatened to destroy an entire small market would be unfair; a small
use that had little effect on a large market might be fair.
Other market failure explanations of fair use have similar flaws. As discussed
above, parody is often seen as a classic example of fair use justified by market
failure. 129 An author is unlikely to license another work that parodies their
work, so the presumptive reliance on voluntary transactions will not work. But a
closer examination undermines this analysis. Campbell shows that parodies often
could be licensed. In Campbell, the subject of the parody was a song by Roy
Orbison. By the time the parody was written, the copyright was in the hands of
Acuff-Rose. This is not an exceptional case. 130 Because of the work-for-hire
rule 131 and transfers of copyright, 132 many if not most significant copyrights
are in the hands of corporate owners rather than individual creators. 133 The
copyright in a work frequently is transferred by the author. In the case of
works for hire, the copyright vests not in the actual author but in the
employer. If making a parody of such a work is a viable commercial project, then
the sensibilities of the copyright holder (as opposed to the original author),
would often be no obstacle. Moreover, in the cases where the original author is
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the copyright owner [*87] and refuses to license a parody, terming that market
failure is too broad. A rational author might well refuse to take money in
exchange for subjecting their creations to distortion and ridicule. 134 So the
transaction cost explanation of parody is both overbroad and too narrow.
The next Part suggests that a better explanation lies in using fair use to
permit free flow of uncopyrightable ideas. 135 More generally, the privatization
rationale behind the transaction cost approach to fair use proves too much. If
fair use should be narrowed in order to maximally privatize copyright, then the
same reasoning would support narrowing other limitations on copyright. In
particular, logical extension of the privatization argument would argue for
narrowing the basic rule that copyright does not protect ideas. If intellectual
products are most effectively exploited by converting them into property, then
to some extent ideas should be copyrightable. But ideas are better developed by
making them freely available for use, criticism, and development by all.
Before turning to an alternative conception of fair use, there are additional
fundamental objections that might be made to the transaction cost approach. Even
if privatizing copyright were more efficient than permitting a broader scope for
fair use, one could argue against it simply on distributional grounds, that
granting greater initial entitlements to authors is sufficiently inequitable to
overcome any efficiency justifications. Second, one could turn away from the
incentive analysis of copyright law to other philosophical frameworks. The
privatization approach to copyright, which logically supports considerable
expansion of the right of copyright holders, has led some to reject economics as
a basis for prescriptive analysis of copyright law. Such commentators argue
instead for a natural rights approach 136 or see copyright as [*88] intended
to foster a utopian society 137 or a civil democratic society. 138 This Article
will argue in a more pragmatic fashion that arguments for maximal privatization
of copyright (which support the transaction approach to fair use) fail on their
own terms. Natural rights analysis might provide a more satisfactory
philosophical basis for copyright than economics does, but consideration of
natural rights is less likely to provide a guide to specific applications of
fair use. It seems rather unlikely that sufficient consensus will form any time
soon on the content of natural rights or even on whether natural rights are
simply "nonsense upon stilts." 139 One could also construct an argument against
the privatization approach on constitutional grounds. Congress is authorized to
promote knowledge by granting copyrights to authors and patents to inventors.
140 One could interpret that provision as limiting copyright to measures
providing an incentive to produce works. 141 The Supreme Court has stated that
Congress lacks power to authorize patents that remove knowledge from, or
restrict access to, the public domain. 142 The same limitation could be applied
to the copy [*89] right power, which is in the same clause of Article I of the
Constitution. 143 Expanding fair use at the expense of the public domain would
arguably violate that limitation. Until such time as the Court speaks to
potential constitutional or philosophical arguments, however, the fair use
doctrine will play the primary role in determining the extent of the
privatization of copyright.
III. Fair Use as a Means to Implement Other
Copyright Limits
This Part argues that the fair use doctrine has a broader role than conceived by
the transaction cost approach. Certainly, fair use can be justified by
prohibitive transaction costs in many settings where a potential user could not
reasonably locate, contact, and negotiate with the copyright holder and other
affected parties. Thus, the existence of transaction costs may justify as fair
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use many de minimus uses that the copyright holder would not object to, such as
copying a story from the day's newspaper to send to a friend. But this Article
will argue that the role of fair use is broader and more central to the overall
structure of copyright law. Under the transaction cost approach, the balance
between the interests of copyright holders and potential users is set by the
requirements of originality, the idea/expression distinction, and the other
limits on copyrightable subject matter. Fair use, under that view, serves only
as an exception to the property right under exigent circumstances. This Article
will argue that fair use has served a broader, more flexible role to implement
the other limitations. This will be termed the "balancing approach" to fair use.
In this view, fair use should apply not just where transaction costs obstruct
licensing, but also where mechanical enforcement of the copyright holder's
exclusive rights would grant the holder excessive control over noncopyrightable
elements of the work. This approach is consistent with the common conception of
fair use as balancing competing interests, and contrary to the view that fair
use should wither away as technology lowers the costs of disseminating [*90]
works. 144 Under this rule, fair use would serve the same policies as copyright
infringement analysis generally. 145
The balancing approach to fair use would not simply balance the benefits from a
particular use against the possible detriment to the author. 146 This would
result in an unnecessarily broad view of fair use. Copyright exists to provide
authors returns that exceed marginal cost. The balancing role of fair use,
rather, is the same as the balancing function of the originality requirement,
the idea/expression distinction, and other limitations on copyright. Each of
those limitations serves to protect authors against free-riders (and thus
provide incentives for authors to produce otherwise piratable public goods), but
also avoids granting authors excessive returns. This Part will discuss how the
case law under fair use can be broadly construed as attempting to implement that
balance. The next Part then discusses how fair use will fit into the rapid
expansion of digital technologies. As discussed above, some transaction costs
will be reduced and accordingly copyright holders may justifiably seek revenue
in settings that might have been fair use. But digital technologies will also
lead to broader application of fair use. Because digital technologies involve
copying as part of use, some uses that might have been outside the copyright
holder's exclusive rights may now involve making a copy. Fair use may thus be
necessary to prevent the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from
undue control over the noncopyrightable aspects of her work.
This conception of fair use is both broader and less unified than the
transaction cost approach. Fair use, under this view, is analogous to the good
faith doctrine in contract law. Cases finding bad faith are not susceptible of a
single theoretical justification. 147 Rather, they resemble each other in a more
general way that has been compared to [*91] Wittgenstein's notion of family
resemblance. 148 Similarly, the resistance of the fair use doctrine to simple
definition, which courts and commentators have long bemoaned, may be key to its
flexible role. Accordingly, this section will discuss how courts have applied
fair use to prevent copyright owners from restricting use of copyrighted works,
protecting functional aspects of works, controlling facts, even shielding
governmental expenditures from criticism. In each case, transaction costs would
not have prevented a licensing agreement; rather, applying fair use diminished
the ability of the copyright holder to realize revenue from the work. This
Article will further argue that such a balancing approach provides a more
satisfying interpretation of the parody cases and is consistent with the Supreme
Court's fair use opinions.
Where some copying is necessary in order to use a work, courts have applied fair

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991181

use. 149 Under the transaction cost approach, permission from the copyright
holder would have been required, but judicial decisions have been to the
contrary. The classic example is Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, in
which the copyrighted book set out step-by-step guidelines for reorganizing
corporations, complete with wording of model legal documents. 150 The court held
that fair use authorized such copying as was necessary to implement the plans.
151 Accordingly, there was no infringement where defendant copied the wording
from the book into the documents drafted to implement such transactions.
Similarly, Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Company 152 held that fair use
permitted copying from an advertising manual, which had provided forms and model
advertisements. 153
Perhaps the best example of using fair use to permit access to uncopyrightable
aspects of works is its application to computer software. Courts have applied
fair use to authorize copying to exploit the unprotected functional aspects of
digital technologies. 154 Such deci [*92] sions have held that fair use
authorized reverse engineering, which entails making a copy of a program in
order to study the operational aspects of the program. 155 Again, the
transaction cost approach would have yielded a different result. A license could
have been negotiated that authorized such copying for limited purposes. But
presumably the licensing fee would have been high, because the software
copyright holder would often prefer to keep such functional aspects from
disclosure, in order to maintain a competitive advantage. So if copyright
prevented making copies necessary to figure out the unprotected functional
aspects, then the copyright would in effect extend to the functional aspects of
the program. By permitting reverse engineering, fair use thus serves to restore
the balance struck in the rule that copyright protects only expressive, not
functional aspects.
Just as fair use permits some copying to get at the unprotected functional
aspects of a copyrighted work, it may also have the effect of unlocking
unprotected factual aspects of a work. In Time Incorporated v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 156 a book about the assassination of [*93] President Kennedy
illustrated its theories by borrowing from a copyrighted work, the home movie of
the event made by a spectator, Abraham Zapruder. 157 Working from frames of the
movie (which were publicly available as exhibits to the Warren Commission report
on the assassination), defendants made charcoal sketches representing the scene
as portrayed in the movie. 158
Courts have also used fair use in a more subtle way to balance the incentives of
copyright by distinguishing between "productive" and "reproductive" uses. 159 A
reproductive use simply makes copies that compete with the copies authorized by
the copyright holder. 160 Where a use is productive, however, defendant goes
beyond copying to contribute some independent value. 161 Productive uses have
been more likely to qualify for fair use. Making a copy of a computer program in
order to study it as a process of writing other programs would be a productive
use. 162 Copying a program in order to sell it in competition with the copyright
holder would be a less favored reproductive use. 163 The transaction cost
approach would give much less weight to the productive nature of the use. If the
new use was productive, then presumably an appropriate licensing fee could be
paid from the surplus created. 164 Moreover, requiring licensing fees would
enable the copyright holder to determine which uses were the most productive and
[*94] license them accordingly. 165 But such failure to recognize the
productive nature of some uses permits the copyright holder to capture as much
as possible of the new value created by such uses. It could also have perverse
effects on the incentives created by copyright. 166 If copyright holders have a
greater ability to capture the value created by their work than do other
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activities, than resources could be channeled toward creation of copyrightable
works and away from other productive activities not protected by such a
monopoly. 167
Fair use can also serve to implement the more narrow limitations on
copyrightable subject matter. Works of the United States government are not
subject to copyright protection. 168 Because the government has funded the work,
copyright is not necessary to provide an incentive for its creation. Moreover,
granting the government exclusive rights to control dissemination of its
products raises serious questions about accountability. The decision of
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association 169 introduced such policy matters
into the fair use balance. In Wojnarowicz, federal funds supported an art
exhibit. 170 Defendant, who objected to the content of the exhibit, published a
pamphlet that reproduced parts of the supposedly objectionable works. 171
Because federal funds had supported display and dissemination of the works, the
court reasoned that fair use would be more broadly construed, to permit copying
if it were necessary in order to object to use of tax revenues.
The previous Part discussed how the transaction cost approach provides an
unsatisfactory explanation of the fair use parody cases. 172 The ready
application of fair use to parody is better understood as implementing the
principle that the author has no control over the ideas expressed in their work.
In order to free others to attack those ideas, a [*95] parody may be permitted
as fair use. Parody also illustrates the role of status considerations. In those
cases where the author does control the copyright, the author is likely to
refuse permission to a parody because of status considerations.
A contest between superheroes illustrates the ill fit of the transaction cost
approach with parody. In Warner Brothers, Incorporated v. American Broadcasting,
Incorporated, 173 ABC's television program "The Greatest American Hero" parodied
Superman with a more diffident superhero. As discussed above, the transaction
cost approach would justify the application of fair use by an author's presumed
unwillingness to license a parody. But this was not a setting where the author's
tender feelings would have prevented a voluntary licensing transaction. The
original authors of Superman had sold their copyright in the cartoons many years
ago, and were now living in modest circumstances. 174 The copyright to Superman
was held by a corporation, which has shown considerable interest in maximizing
the revenue from Superman. Indeed, the parties had considered a licensing
agreement. Nor was the parody one which would have so offended the author as to
prevent permission. Rather, the program very gently poked fun at some of the
standard parts of the Superman stories. So a better explanation of the
application of fair use is that it permits authors to parody other works without
permission because such freedom fosters the creativity that copyright exists to
support.
The balancing approach also provides a more coherent basis for the recent fair
use decisions of the Supreme Court. As noted above, Harper & Row has been
interpreted as following the transaction approach to fair use. In holding that
fair use did not authorize the Nation to print several hundred words of Gerald
Ford's autobiography, the Court indicated that fair use should apply where a
reasonable copyright owner would have consented to the use. 175 Harper & Row is
entirely consistent with a balancing approach to fair use. One could argue that
fair use should have applied in order to prevent control over noncopyrighted
facts. But the Nation could have reported the relevant facts without taking
Ford's [*96] expression of them. Rather, the Nation quoted entire passages of
Ford's writing. The Court stated that some direct quotation may have been
necessary to convey the facts, such as Ford's "characterization of the White
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House tapes as the "smoking gun,'" 176 but most of the facts could have been
paraphrased.
Harper & Row frames fair use as whether a "reasonable" copyright holder would
have consented to the use. One can read that as asking whether the copyright
holder would have agreed to license the use, had transaction costs not
interfered. 177 But that requires a departure from the normal understanding of
the reasonable person standard. Judge Learned Hand, whose landmark opinions
continue to set the terms for copyright analysis, certainly gave a different
content to the test in the familiar formulation from United States v. Carroll
Towing, 178 which questions whether a reasonable person would take a precaution
by asking whether the cost of the precaution is less than the expected damages
to the potential victim. The test forces the actor to consider both the costs to
themself and to the potential victim - a balancing test. Similarly, fair use can
balance the incentives to the author against the costs to potential users. Thus,
under Harper & Row, fair use analysis would certainly consider whether the
copyright holder would have sought a licensing fee for the use. But where a fee
would have included a premium traceable to protection of noncopyrightable
material (such as functional or factual aspects of the work), a court could hold
that a reasonable copyright owner would not have sought such leverage.
A recent case concerning a videotape of a notorious incident shows how the
transaction cost approach is too narrow to address the necessary concerns. 179
The Los Angeles News Service videotaped the assault of a truck-driver during
disturbances in Los Angeles. The news service licensed other media outlets to
show the tape for a fee. One local television station copied and showed portions
of the tape without permission, and raised the defense of fair use. Under the
transaction cost approach, the case is straightforward. Fair use would clearly
be inapplicable, because the use could have been licensed. But the case, like
Harper & Row raises issues of protection of facts and matters of [*97] public
concern that require a closer examination, although a balancing analysis might
well reach the same result on those particular facts.
The other recent key Supreme Court decision on fair use, Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, 180 reads much more consistently with a
balancing approach than with the transaction cost approach. In Sony, the holders
of copyrights in television programs sought to hold the manufacturers of
videocassette recorders liable for contributory copyright infringement, for
selling machines that consumers used to copy television programs. 181 The Court
held that fair use authorized individuals to "time-shift" programs, to tape
programs for later viewing. Transaction costs would indeed prevent licensing in
individual situations. It would be quixotic for a student to seek permission
from Monty Python to tape an episode while the student was in class. But such
transaction costs do not justify fair use where mechanisms exist for collective
licensing. If Sony had denied fair use, then VCR manufacturers could have
arranged to pay a royalty from VCR sales to organizations representing
television copyright holders. 182 Rather, Sonyrests on the idea that a copyright
holder's prerogatives should not give it control over markets beyond the market
for its work. If the Sony court had denied fair use, then the television
copyright holders would have effectively controlled not just the market for
their work but also the market for video cassette recorders. 183
The transaction cost approach is also hard to square with the many cases holding
that some types of harm to the copyright holder will be disregarded in the fair
use analysis. 184 Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority 185 held it was fair use
for the Moral Majority to reproduce [*98] material from Hustler magazine in
its fund-raising circular. 186 Consumers Union of United States v. General
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Signal Corporation 187 upheld use in advertising of passages from the Consumer
Report's product assessments, even if such use could arguably damage Consumer
Report's credibility. National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun Control
Federation of Ohio 188 held fair use authorized distribution of a list of
legislators prepared by a lobbying organization. In such cases, transaction
costs were not the obstacle to licensing. Rather, fair use was appropriately
applied to prevent the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from
becoming an instrument for controlling the flow of ideas.
Fair use can thus be interpreted as a tool to implement the core limitations on
copyright, rather than simply a device to apply when transaction costs obstruct
licensing agreements. The next Part contrasts the analysis of the balancing and
transaction cost approaches in several settings.
IV. Applications
This Part takes problems in fair use (from cases, proposed legislation, and life
in the digital age) and compares the transaction cost and balancing approaches.
Rather than a detailed application of the statutory factors, this Article will
focus on the key differences between the two modes of analysis. The transaction
cost approach (rooted in the privatization view of copyright) focusses on the
question, whether the parties could have reached an agreement to license the
use. The balancing approach (seeing fair use as balancing incentives) goes on to
consider whether denying fair use would effectively grant the copyright [*99]
holder a measure of control over noncopyrightable aspects of the work, such as
ideas, functional aspects, or markets other than those to sell or license the
work. The fair use issues discussed here involve quite different types of
copying: copying a letter to comment on its author, copying a computer program
in the process of using it, copying a digital work while circumventing
anti-copying technology, copying cartoon characters to comment on their cultural
place, copying a web page to include it in a massive archive, and photocopying
scholarly works for students and researchers. The transaction cost approach
would accord presumptive control over copying to the copyright holder, unless
negotiating a license were impractical. The balancing approach would consider
whether the type of use at issue should be beyond the control of the copyright
holder. A case that encapsulates the contrast is Lish v. Harper's Magazine
Foundation. 189 Harper's Magazine printed lengthy excerpts from the letter of a
writing teacher sent to solicit students for a writing seminar. 190 The letter
both reflected the unusually secretive nature of the seminars and showed the
teacher's rather eccentric writing style. The court denied fair use in terms
consonant with the privatization approach, holding that the teacher should be
able to strictly control distribution of his writing. A balancing approach would
have more given weight to the letter's status as a record of the writing style
of someone holding himself out as a writing teacher. Publishing excerpts of the
letter would not compete with sales of the author's work, although the implicit
criticism might have hurt the teacher's reputation. Fair use, under a balancing
approach, could serve to prevent such an author from controlling debate about
his work.
Moving to a broader problem, fair use could help adjust copyright law to the
prevalence of copying as an aspect of both use and dissemination of digital
works. In particular, fair use can provide a tempered approach to the issue of
whether a temporary copy in the working memory of a computer constitutes a copy
for the purposes of copyright law. 191 At the risk of oversimplifying, a
computer generally uses two types of [*100] memory: permanent memory and
working memory. 192 Suppose an individual owns a personal computer with various
types of software loaded onto it. While the computer is turned off, the software
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will sit in the permanent memory (which could include the computer's hard disk,
ROM chips, the floppy disks distributed in its vicinity, compact discs or other
media such as tapes). When the computer is turned on, it activates its working
memory. Any software that the computer accesses must be copied from permanent
memory into working memory, because the processor of the computer works
primarily with that small, fast, dynamic memory. So the operating system
software (which runs the computer) and any applications software (broadly
understood, anything that the user uses or interacts with other than the
operating systems software) all must be copied to the extent they are used. So
to utilize a computer program, indeed even to turn on a computer, causes some
software to be copied within the computer. Courts have held that making such a
temporary copy constitutes making a copy for the purposes of copyright law. 193
Some have argued that a temporary copy within a computer's working memory should
not constitute a copy for the purposes of copyright law. 194 In this view, one
makes a copy only by making a permanent copy. Implementing that view might
require a shift in judicial authority or an amendment of the present wording of
the copyright statute. 195 But, more fundamentally, excepting temporary copies
from the scope of [*101] copyright law could threaten the legitimate rights of
copyright holders, by permitting dissemination of copies if recipients did not
save them in permanent form. 196 On the other hand, mechanically treating a
temporary copy made without permission of the copyright holder as infringement
can swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. The case law on the
potential liability of computer maintenance providers shows the hazards of such
reasoning. 197 The leading case, Triad Systems v. Southeastern Express, 198
provides a good example. Triad Systems made computers used by automotive parts
dealers for various bookkeeping tasks. 199 Triad sold the software that ran the
computers and performed the bookkeeping functions. 200 Triad also sold its
services to maintain Triad computers, in competition with an independent service
organization. 201 To service a Triad computer, the [*102] independent servicer
would run the software provided with the computer, including the operating
system, utilities and diagnostic programs, which would require that the software
be copied from the permanent storage (either the computer's hard disk or a tape
drive) into the computer's working memory. 202 The Ninth Circuit held that such
use did not constitute fair use, in terms that track the transaction cost
approach. Under the balancing approach to fair use, however, the independent
servicer would likely qualify for fair use. 203 The servicer was making a
productive use of the software that was copied. The use also sought to exploit
the functional aspects of the work, to use it in order to service the very
computer the software was provided with. Although the Ninth Circuit did not
explore the issue, it is also likely that the servicer was employing nonoriginal
as well as original aspects of Triad's work. 204 It seems unlikely that Triad
wrote operating system software and applications software without using other
programs as models or even incorporating code from public domain sources. 205
Applying fair use would prevent a computer manufacturer from having a monopoly
on the market to service such computers, a market separate from the market for
software to run on the computers.
The balancing approach also leads to less strict protection than has been
proposed for digital "copyright management." 206 Nascent technologies promise
the ability to code copies of digital works to permit [*103] copyright holders
to closely monitor and control any use made of the copies:

Thus, for example, if I purchase a collection of essays online, the copyright
owner can charge me for the file containing the essays, generate a record of my
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identity and what I have purchased, and insert pieces of microcode into the file
that will: (1) notify the copyright owner every time I "open" one of the essays
and specify which one I opened; (2) notify me when I must remit additional fees
to the copyright owner - this much to browse the essay, this much to print it
out, this much to extract an excerpt, and so on; and (3) prevent me from
opening, printing, or excerpting the piece until I have paid. 207
One catch to using technological devices to prevent copying is that people can
figure out ways around them. As a lexicon of computer jargon puts it: "copy
protection: n. A class of methods for preventing incompetent pirates from
stealing software and legitimate customers from using it. Considered silly." 208
Proposed legislation in Congress would give copyright holders considerable legal
weapons against anyone who tried to circumvent such protections. It would be
illegal to provide devices or services that "avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate,
or otherwise circumvent" such copyright management systems. 209 It would
likewise be illegal to tamper with "copyright management information," broadly
defined to include not just the name of the copyright holder but any terms and
conditions the owner proposes for use of the work. 210 Because such works are
precisely the ones for which fair use would no longer be available (transaction
costs having been shrunk by the [*104] copyright holder posting terms for
use), fair use would presumably not excuse any such tampering; nor does the
proposed statute make these strict protections subject to fair use. Such
stringent protection follows as a matter of course from the transaction
approach. Copyright owners may attach to each copy precise terms for any
possible use and any user must either agree to and abide by those terms or go
elsewhere. The balancing approach to fair use would suggest a more tempered
approach. Recognizing that the copyright protection code locks up not just
copyrighted expression but also unprotected ideas and nonoriginal elements, a
balancing approach would amend (or interpret) the proposed statute to allow
access in some settings, even if that involved circumventing the protective
coding.
It is instructive to compare the proposed high level of protection for copyright
management technology with the present, considerably lower level of protection
for the artistic integrity of works. Under Section 106A, the author of a work of
visual art may prevent others from distorting, mutilating, or destroying the
work. 211 But these protections are sharply circumscribed. The moral rights
apply only to works like painting, sculpture and limited edition photographs,
and specifically exclude works for hire. 212 Moreover, the moral rights are
specifically made subject to fair use. 213 So although it may be legal to
distort or mutilate a digital artwork, it may soon be illegal to fiddle with the
legalese attached to it. A balancing approach would avoid such an incongruity.
[*105] Another area that would be treated differently under the transaction
cost and balancing approaches is fair use in creating derivative works. The
logic of privatization favors broad protection of the exclusive right to make
derivative works (the right to recast the work into new forms). Concentrating
the right to make derivative works in a single person would give an incentive to
exploit that right in the most efficient manner. Along these lines, granting the
copyright holder in a book the exclusive right to make a film based on the book
is thought to avoid a "multiple taker" problem. 214 Unless a single person has
the right to make the film of the book, no one would have the incentive to
invest the many millions of dollars now necessary to make a feature film. This
claim is certainly debatable as an empirical matter. The recent spate of Jane
Austen films, all based on public domain material, certainly shows that
exclusive rights to a book are not essential to permit the necessary investment
in a movie. More important, the logic of this approach would lead to a broad
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interpretation of the derivative right, in order to prevent unauthorized
competitors. Such a broad interpretation would stifle not just commercial
competition, but permit the copyright holder to control the cultural view of the
work. Under the balancing approach, the copyright holder would still have the
right to make derivative works, but the leeway afforded to comment, criticism,
and other uses would be much greater.
To take an example, the privatization approach would support the holding in Walt
Disney Production v. Air Pirates. 215 The defendants in Disney produced a
counterculture comic that portrayed various Disney characters engaged in
distinctly nonDisney activities, such as drug use and bawdy behavior. 216 The
Ninth Circuit denied fair use. 217 Such a result reflects the privatization
rationale of the transaction cost approach, which would leave it to Disney to
decide on the most effective commercial exploitation of its characters. If the
public demand for works portraying Disney characters in such a light were
sufficient, then Disney itself could produce them. If Disney were concerned that
such comics could adversely affect its use of the characters in other areas,
however, then Disney could prevent any such works. A balancing [*106] approach
to fair use, however, might reach a different result. Portrayals of Disney
characters so engaged might well harm the sales of Disney products, but not in a
way that would favor Disney in the balance of incentives. The comics would not
substitute for Disney's sales of its copyrighted work. Rather, the comics
effectively brought into question the role that Disney characters play
culturally. 218
Air Pirates also shows another flaw in maximizing reliance on voluntary
licensing to produce new works incorporating elements of existing works. The
author of an existing work is likely to be considerably more risk averse than
other authors who wish to incorporate it into new works. Thus, Disney would
balance possible revenues from a new work against the risks to sales of previous
works, thus considerably discounting the value to Disney of using its characters
in new ways. An author with no vested interest in the existing works is more
likely to try something risky. Willingness to take risks is often a key
ingredient to creative work. Accordingly, granting authors expanded control over
new uses of their work is likely to have considerable dampening effects on
cultural flourishing. This certainly does not counsel depriving copyright
holders of the control over markets for their work or of derivative works that
spring from their work. But it does suggest that the bounds of fair use cannot
be set simply by asking whether a use could have been licensed. The
privatization view confuses the change in an idea with the depletion of a
resource. 219 As discussed above, a strong reason for privatizing physical
property is that placing it in private [*107] hands allows market forces to
allocate it to the highest valued use. But informational works are not depleted,
rather they are tested, propagated, and transformed through use.
The transaction cost and balancing approaches would also yield different results
on whether copyrights are being infringed by a project currently underway to
archive the Internet's World-Wide Web. 220 Under the transaction cost approach,
such an effort would likely not qualify for fair use, particularly if such
archiving exceeded any limitation stated expressly on the web page or elsewhere.
The makers of such an archive are in a position to use market forces to capture
the benefits of their effort, by charging access fees to anyone who wants to
utilize the archive. The archivists would only have to pay web page authors who
demanded payments, not everyone on the entire Internet. So if transaction costs
were the guide, fair use might not authorize the project. By contrast, the
balancing approach would likely hold the archiving to be fair use, even where it
exceeded the permission granted by individual web page authors. 221 The archive
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has considerable historical and research values and has little effect on the
incentives of authors. Moreover, much of what the archive would capture would
not be covered by copyright. Many web pages contain noncopyrightable facts on
functional aspects, as well as copyrightable expression. So a balancing analysis
would likely permit archiving as fair use.
In each of the foregoing examples, the transaction cost approach yields a simple
but troubling analysis, because it excludes important policy considerations. The
balancing approach may require a more complicated analysis, but that simply
reflects the fact that the distinctions on which copyright relies are complex.
Concepts like originality, ideas, and functionality have defied easy definition
and will continue to do so.
The recent controversial decisions on photocopying illustrate how the balancing
approach supplements, rather than displaces, the transaction [*108] cost
approach. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 222 Texaco maintained a
library of scientific and technical journals. Texaco regularly informed its
researchers of recently published articles and provided photocopies of articles
to the researchers upon request. In Princeton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, 223 a copyshop received lists of book excerpts from
university instructors, made photocopies of the excerpts and sold them bundled
into coursepacks. Appellate courts ultimately denied fair use in both cases.
Both cases involve uses favored in fair use analysis, research and education.
224 Nonetheless, neither appears to be a case where the copyright holder was
seeking protection of unprotected aspects of the work. Had this been a
competitor trying to impede Texaco's research, an author seeking to keep
critical students from reading the work, or a software producer worried that
young hackers might figure out its programs and write better ones, then fair use
would be more apt. But, at the risk of oversimplifying, both cases boiled down
to a commercial entity systematically providing a cheaper source of copies than
the copyright holder. Certainly, fair use would likely apply if the potential
user could not otherwise get copies at a reasonable price. But if Texaco could
fund copies from the revenues following from its research, or if students could
purchase copies at a reasonable price (or, more likely, if the publishers would
license photocopies of excerpts to be made), then denying fair use could simply
be enforcing the balance struck by the general outline of copyright law.
V. Conclusion
The transaction cost approach might simplify fair use analysis. But the
clarification of the doctrine would only distort the overall effect of copyright
law. Mechanical enforcement of the exclusive rights in some settings could
effectively give copyright holders a measure of control over noncopyrightable
ideas and functional aspects of their work. Such a prospect, in turn, would
simply shift the balancing concerns to the infringement analysis. Clarifying
fair use by surgically narrowing it would only complicate other areas of
copyright law. The difficulty in [*109] fair use simply reflects the
difficulty in defining the boundaries of copyright. Fair use originally arose as
part of the infringement analysis in copyright cases. 225 Fair use has served to
adapt copyright to several generations of technology, but has become a tangled
doctrine in the process. The transaction cost approach bids to reduce fair use
to a simple, quantifiable analysis and remove it from the core issues of
copyright. But copyright law will adapt to digital technologies best by
retaining its flexibility. 226 Fair use can serve as a means to implement the
other limits on copyright. The works subject to copyright are increasingly being
created and disseminated in digital forms, and digital technologies copy works
repeatedly for many functions. A balanced approach to fair use can help protect
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the copyright holder's prerogatives while preserving the limitations on those
exclusive rights.
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just a way to give the author incentives to produce in the first instance. It
also organizes the way already-produced works are rationed and coordinated.");
Hardy, supra, note 12, at 234-40, 252-53 (arguing that concentrating entitlement
in copyright holder facilitates efficient transactions and use of work).
n70. Hardy, supra note 12, at 240-42 (explaining that transactions that are
usually amenable to fair use are trivial or undertaken for unusually worthy
purposes).
n71. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 10.1.
n72. Id. at 10.1.1.
n73. Id. at 10.1.
n74. Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1615.
n75. Id. at 1614.
n76. See Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392.
n77. Posner, supra note 66, at 174.
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n78. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in
Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1995).
n79. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 12 (analyzing copyright law in terms
of weighing incentives to authors against costs to other authors).
n80. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics
of Preemption, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 959, 972 (1991) ("Whereas the fulcrum of the
economic balance struck by patent law is the standards for patentability, the
most important economic pressure point in copyright law is not the question of
copyrightability but the question of fair use."); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 889-90
(1997) (discussing fair use as analogous to patent law mechanisms that balance
incentives of intellectual property).
n81. See supra text accompanying note 75.
n82. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 29 (early formulation of the incentive
analysis of intellectual property); Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 357-58
(setting up framework for incentive analysis of copyright law doctrines).
n83. For information on the proposed legislation, together with criticism of the
bill, see Dennis Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension (visited Feb. 3, 1998)
<http://www.public.asu.edu/dkarjala/>. For trenchant criticism, on the grounds
that extension would benefit mainly "a very small group: children and
grandchildren of famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the
public domain," see William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System:
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 907, 932 (1997).
n84. 17 U.S.C. 302 (Supp. 1996).
n85. Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. 604, 105th Cong. 2 (1997).
n86. See id.
n87. See Karjala, supra note 83.
n88. See sources cited supra note 12.
n89. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
n90. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). For further discussion on parody and fair use, see
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Anastasia P.
Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767 (1996); Alfred C.
Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law,
62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 79 (1991); A. Hunter Farrell, Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Material in Advertisement Parodies, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1550 (1992).
n91. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98 (arguing that Harper & Row adopted
a neoclassical economic view that would restrict fair use to "highly
circumscribed instances of bilateral market failure.").
n92. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88.
n93. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 n.9 (citing T. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The
Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept. Of Justice Economic Policy Office
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Discussion Paper 13-17 (1984)); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982).
n94. Id. at 550 (quoting Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyright Works (1958),
reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16, prepared
for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1960)).
n95. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. Legal Stud. 67 (1992).
n96. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993); Landes & Posner,
supra note 12; Winslow, supra note 90.
n97. For a critique of the economic conceptualization of property, see Margaret
Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (1996).
n98. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 219; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and
Benefits; Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. 449,
472-73 (1992) (arguing that concentrating rights in copyright owners facilities
efficient use by requiring prospective users of the work to bargain with
copyright holders).
n99. The arguments and assumptions of the property rights argument, as applied
to treatment of improvements of copyrighted works, have been criticized on the
grounds that various obstacles to market transactions exist. See Lemley, supra
note 25, at 1048-69 (discussing difficulties of identifying and organizing
improvers, and obstacles imposed by transaction costs, uncertainty,
externalities, strategic behavior, noneconomic incentives, and problems of
market power and hold-ups).
n100. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 234-36.
n101. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1378-84 (discussing physical edges
of tangible property and intellectual property's functional equivalents); see
also Timothy P. Terrell & Jane Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual
Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34
Emory L.J. 1, 24 (1985) (discussing intellectual property's lack of "thingness"
compared to tangible property).
n102. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Tort Law: Cases and Economic Analysis 35, 765
(1982) (describing conversion as highly technical and quoting a description of
nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle") (quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol.
Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (1977)).
n103. See U.C.C. 9-314, 9-315 (1997) (complicated statutory scheme attempting to
address competing interests where goods become accessions, i.e., goods installed
in or affixed to other goods).
n104. But see Hardy, supra note 12, at 246-47, 260 (acknowledging
boundary-drawing problems posed by the idea/expression dichotomy, but concluding
that the cost of drawing borders will be no higher for informational property
than for real property).
n105. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 32 (discussing the difficulty of determining
how much of a published new arrangement of a musical work is public domain
material and how much is protected).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991181

n106. See Litman, supra note 32, at 1023 ("Copyright law purports to define the
nature and scope of the property rights it confers by relying on the concept of
originality. In fact, originality is an apparition; it does not, and cannot,
provide a basis for deciding copyright cases."); see also Boyle, supra note 13,
at 163-64 (discussing how intellectual property law has manipulated the concept
of originality).
n107. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 90. It is also difficult to decide how much
original contribution is required to qualify for copyright. A court recently
held that the West Publishing Company's versions of federal court opinions did
not qualify as "original works of authorship," where West had added minor
changes to the case captions, the names of judges and attorneys, and other
factual material. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94,0589
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997). The court thus did not follow a heavily criticized
opinion that had accorded West protection in its arrangement of cases and
internal pagination, and denied fair use. See Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West Publ'g
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996).
n108. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
n109. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980).
n110. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1985).
n111. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
n112. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
n113. See, e.g., John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under
Learned Hand's Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1992). Leading cases in the area include: Apple Computer v.
Microsoft, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1991); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an operating system program may be copyrighted,
because there are many ways to express the same functions).
n114. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (holding that a
spreadsheet program's menu command structure was not copyrightable subject
matter); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (similar);
Engineering Dynamics v. Structural Software, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995)
(restricting copyright to nonfunctional elements of user interface); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs, 70 Tul. L. Rev.
2397 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 6 High
Tech. L.J. 209 (1992); Robert L. Bocchino, Jr., Note, Computers, Copyright, and
Functionality: The First Circuit's Decision in Lotus Development Corp. v.
Borland International, Inc., 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 467 (1996); Michael J.
Schallop, Comment, Protecting User Interfaces: Not as Easy as 1-2-3, 45 Emory
L.J. 1533 (1996).
n115. On the difficulties courts have faced, see Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does
Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of
Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 723 (1988). See also Dennis M. Carleton, A
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Behavior-Based Model for Determining Software Copyright Infringement, 10 High
Tech. L.J. 405 (1995).
n116. Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992); see also Jon
S. Wilkins, Note, Protecting Computer Programs as Compilations Under Computer
Associates v. Altai, 104 Yale L.J. 435 (1994).
n117. Subsequent decisions have found Computer Associatespersuasive. See Mitek
Holdings v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996) (addressing, as an
issue of first impression for the circuit, the scope of copyright protection for
nonliteral elements of computer programs); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural
Software, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994); Autoskill v. National Educ. Support
Sys., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1992). On applying the abstraction testing to
software, see David W. T. Daniels, Comment, Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo:
A Better Way to Think About the Non-Literal, Non-Visual Software Copyright
Cases, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613 (1994). See also Richard A. Beutel, Software
Engineering Practices, and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can Structured Design
Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 Jurimetrics J. 1
(1991) (attempting to distinguish between functional and descriptive elements).
n118. See Samuelson et al., supra note 56.
n119. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88 (regarding fair use).
n120. Cf. Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, 10
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 423, 437 n.37 (1992) (discussing how welfare maximizing
effects of property entitlements may be offset by bargaining costs introduced by
vagueness in copyright entitlements). In some settings, a little uncertainty
about a legal entitlement may promote bargaining. See Jason Scott Johnston,
Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256 (1995); Ian
Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995).
n121. See infra text accompanying 144-88 (regarding fair use).
n122. One can question the validity of applying fair use only in situations
where transaction costs prevented a license. Because litigation costs are even
greater:

It is hard to imagine a plaintiff bringing a lawsuit (much less going all the
way to the Supreme Court) over a use small enough that she would have been
willing to license it but for transaction costs. The absurd implication of this
theory is that in any case important enough to be litigated, fair use should
never apply!
Lemley, supra note 25, at 1077 n.394.
n123. See Goldstein, supra note 14 at 197-236; Hardy, supra note 1, at 259-60;
see also Benjamin R. Kuhn, A Dilemma In Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for
Intellectual Property Distributed Over the Information Superhighways of Today
and Tomorrow, 10 Temp. Int'l. & Comp. L.J. 171 (1996); see also Cate, supra note
8, at 1425 (discussing how digital technologies could reduce the scope of fair
use in licensing transactions).
n124. See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 197-236.
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n125. Id.
n126. Id. at 223-24.
n127. Negotiating and executing a license for such intellectual property as
software can be expensive and time-consuming. See Lemley, supra note 25, at
1053-54.
n128. See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 229-30.
n129. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
n130. On parody and fair use, see Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(D) Place
in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion From Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 Brook. L. Rev. 1653 (1995). See also L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
n131. The copyright in a work made for hire rests in the employer, not in the
individual that creates the work (unless otherwise agreed upon). 17 U.S.C.
201(b) (1995).
n132. Copyrights may be transferred in whole or in part. 17 U.S.C. 201(d)
(1995).
n133. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 873, 883 (1997); Lemley, supra note 25 at 1033-34 n.212 (estimating
that more than 40% of copyrights are works made-for-hire, on the basis of early
study and recent trends in copyrighted works).
n134. See Lemley, supra note 25; Yen, supra note 90. See also Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982) (discussing how
personal value of property may be more important to the owner than financial
aspects).
n135. See infra text accompanying notes 172-78.
n136. Professor Wendy J. Gordon has written leading explorations of both
economic and natural law bases for copyright. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993). See also Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J.
517 (1990) (arguing that natural law is inherent to copyright). A natural rights
approach could support a considerably narrower copyright than an economic
property rights approach. See Gordon, supra. See also R. Anthony Reese, Note,
Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration
and Reversion, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 707 (1995) (applying Lockean natural rights
analysis to the issue of copyright duration). Other critics of the broad
approach of copyright law have relied on literary theory rather than natural
rights to argue that copyright places too much emphasis on an illusory view of
the creative contribution of individual authors. See Boyle, supra note 13; Peter
Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991
Duke L.J. 455.
n137. See Fisher, supra note 1.
n138. See Netanel, supra note 24; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
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Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 215 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights
and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 841 (1993).
n139. Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in Against the Law 104 (1997)
(quoting Jeremy Bentham in the discussion of a natural rights framework for
discussing the Constitution). A basis for a critical theory of copyright might
be a Lacanian analysis, which has to date been employed much less in legal than
in literary theory. See David S. Caudill, Lacan and the Subject of Law: Toward A
Psychoanalytic Critical Legal Theory 3-25 (1997) (discussing barriers to and
benefits of applying Lacanian framework to legal theory).
n140. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to Promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art.
I, 8, cl. 8. See Heald, supra note 32, at 251 (suggesting that it may be
unconstitutional to use copyright other than to provide incentives for new
creations); see also Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the
Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 97 (1993) (suggesting that the
Constitution grants a right of access to knowledge).
n141. Cf. Cate, supra note 8, at 1396 ("The Copyright Clause requires the
government to carefully tailor those rights to not provide excessive incentive
to the creation and dissemination of expression.").
n142. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); see also Tung Yin, Reviving
Fallen Copyrights: A Constitutional Analysis of Section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994, 17 Loy. L. A. Ent. L.J. 383, 393 (1997).
n143. See Patry, supra note 83, at 914-15 (arguing that copyright extension may
be unconstitutional because it would not serve the purpose of inducing
production of new works); see also Yen, supra note 52, at 393 (discussing
possible constitutional limits).
n144. Fair use analysis by courts and commentators has long been framed in terms
of balancing, although the elements described are frequently different. See,
e.g., Heald, supra note 80, at 972 (describing fair use as the key pressure
point in copyright's economic balance); David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon
for Fair Use Analysis ... At Least as Far as it Goes, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1131
(1994) (arguing that fair use is a safety valve for settings where mechanical
application of copyright's exclusive rights would run contrary to the
fundamental principles of copyright); Kreiss, supra note 78, at 9 (arguing
copyright generally and fair use in particular strike a balance between
incentives and access to works); see also Landes & Posner supra note 12, at 326
(arguing copyright should strike a balance between incentive to authors and
costs to authors of access to existing works).
n145. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing how fair use can play a
similar role in the infringement analysis).
n146. Cf. Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1615.
n147. See Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 88-94
(1985). See also Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392 (suggesting that fair use may
serve several purposes, analogous to the various privileges in property law).
n148. Burton, supra note 147, at 91-94.
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n149. Cf. Litman, supra note 32, at 983-84 (discussing cases holding that
copyright does not protect a way of doing things).
n150. Crume, 140 F.2d 182, 183 (7th Cir. 1944) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 103 (1879)).
n151. Id. at 183-84.
n152. 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914).
n153. Accord American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
n154. See DSC Communications v. DGI Tech., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Sega and Atari gave rise to
considerable commentary. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer
Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of
Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1994); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property
Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1126-27 (1995)
(distinguishing between competition and usurpation); Kreiss, supra note 78;
Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 1087 (1994); Rice, supra note 144 at 1187-88 (1994); see also
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse
Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 975 (1994); see also
Gary R. Ignatin, Note, Let the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering of
Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1999
(1992); Christopher W. Hager, Apples & Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair
Use After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20 Rutgers Computer & Tech.
L.J. 259 (1994). For a thorough discussion of the practice of reverse
engineering, see Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real
World, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 843 (1994). See also Teter, supra note 35. For a
critique of the Sega rationale, see Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New
Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 978 (1993). See also Anthony L. Clapes,
Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativity in the
Digital Arts, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 903 (1994).
n155. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Professor Cohen
has argued persuasively that such cases serve the overall objectives of
copyright law and provide a guide toward the role of fair use in adapting
copyright law to new technologies. See Cohen, supra note 154, at 1130-34; see
also Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Vanessa Marsland,
Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Software-An EC/UK Perspective,
19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1021 (1994); Paul Durdik, Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use
Defense to Software Copyright Infringement, 34 Jurimetrics J. 451 (1994).
n156. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
n157. Id.
n158. Id. Commentators have argued that fair use should apply where some copying
is necessary to get at uncopyrighted aspects of a work. See Cate, supra note 8,
at 1455 (arguing that fair use should apply where the user reproduces facts and
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ideas from a copyrighted work); Heald, supra note 32, at 262 n.121 (arguing fair
use would permit copying of a copyrighted English translation of a public domain
Latin hymn in order to extract the public domain aspects).
n159. See Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in
Fair Use Doctrine, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 677 (1995); William F. Patry & Shira
Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 667 (1993).
n160. See Lape, supra note 159.
n161. Id.
n162. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
n163. Cf. Allen-Myland v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 533-35
(E.D. Pa. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); accord
Cable/Home Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990)
(denying fair use to wholesale copying of a chip).
n164. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 10.43.
n165. 17 U.S.C. 107 (Supp. 1995). Rather, the transaction cost approach would
tend to limit favored uses to those categories specifically named in the
statute: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or
research." See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 10.2-10.2.1.
n166. See Lunney, supra note 18.
n167. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 75 (warning that excessive copyright
protection could attract "too much of the nation's energy into the
copyright-protected sectors of the economy"); Lunney, supra note 18, at 489
(proposing that, in order to prevent copyright from creating allocative
inefficiencies, that copyright should "produce works of authorship if, and only
if, such production would represent the most highly valued use of their
resources").
n168. 17 U.S.C. 107 (1995).
n169. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
n170. Id.
n171. Id.
n172. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36. On the need for a theory of
parody, see Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A
Theory for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 227 (1993).
n173. 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
n174. See Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., Jerry Siegel, Superman's Creator, Dies at 81,
New York Times, Jan. 31, 1996, at B6 (relating how the creator of Superman sold
the copyright in 1938 for $ 130 and thereafter worked as a messenger and a
typist).
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n175. 471 U.S. at 563 (citing 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright 1.10[C] (1996)).
n176. 471 U.S. at 550 (quoting Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyright Works (1958),
reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16, prepared
for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1960)).
n177. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98.
n178. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
n179. Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir.
1997).
n180. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
n181. Id.; see also Ariel B. Taitz, Comment, Removing Road Blocks Along the
Information Superhighway: Facilitating the Dissemination of New Technology by
Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
133 (1995).
n182. See Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1656; see also Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N.
Kirby & Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va.
L. Rev. 383 (1992).
n183. Id.
n184. One can provide for such holdings by broadening the understanding of
"market failure" to include settings where the copyright holder refuses to
license a use out of "anti-dissemination" motives. See Fair Use, supra note 12,
at 1632-35.
n185. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
n186. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 1741 n.352; see also New Era Publications
Int'l. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (use of author's
writings in an unfavorable biography deemed unlikely to harm sales for
authorized biography); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1986) (use in writings against legalized abortion deemed unlikely to overlap
market for pro-choice writings); Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F.
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reproduction of federally supported artwork in
pamphlet opposing funding for National Endowment for the Arts deemed not
competing in market for art); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q.
124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (no cognizable market harm in parody use of Pillsbury
doughboy); but see Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding market for artist's work could be harmed by
advertisement copying his work, on grounds that it suggested artist had licensed
the use).
n187. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Arica Inst. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d
1067 (2d Cir. 1992); Mathieson v. Associated Press, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1685
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (no showing that use by a new service harmed the market for
copies of a photograph of a bulletproof vest endorsed by Oliver North).
n188. 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994).
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